Three Things We Must Learn From The Battle of CAR

Mar 27, 13 Three Things We Must Learn From The Battle of CAR

By now a lot of the dust has settled around the battle which waged for roughly 13 hours a few kilometres outside Bangui at checkpoint PK12. There is a lot of finger-pointing and many expectant questions of just why the hell we were there in the first place. Before larger allegations of uranium and oil deals emerge between South Africa, CAR, France, and god knows who else, we should take stock of three important points that can be learned regardless of how the forthcoming weeks proceed.

Our Soldiers Fought Well

There has been a long-running misconception that our soldiers cannot fight. That they’re all HIV positive layabouts incapable of doing any actual soldiering. Naturally this might be true for certain portions of the military, as it would be for virtually any defence force around the world, but Saturday’s firefight proved, above everything else, that our soldiers are not only capable of defending themselves, they are able to fight back with a tempo that rivals most international forces of the same calibre. 200 paratroopers and Special Forces troops faced off against 3000 rebels advancing, according to the Chief of the SANDF, General Shoke, on a 1km wide front is no laughing matter. That our soldiers were able to hold their ground against a numerically-superior force armed with large-calibre machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and all other manner of weapons, is an impressive feat. That we were able to inflict an estimated 500 casualties on the enemy is an excellent outcome. The loss of 13 SANDF servicemen is tragic, but those lives were not given easily.

No matter what criticism is leveled at higher command, the South African Government, the media, or any other outlet, the South Africans fighting for their lives this past weekend fought bravely and fought well, and that should put to rest any questions on the ability of our elite soldiers. Allegations and rumours of a hurried and panicked retreat in the face of the rebels is by all official and credible accounts false. Our soldiers did not cut and run when the bullets started to fly, but rather held their ground, returned fire, coordinated mortar strikes (according to the CSANDF), organised their lines, and ultimately fought like one would expect a well-trained and disciplined force to act. Amidst the cloud of allegations leveled at the state, that our soldiers fought well must remain a paramount fact above all else.

The Military Learned A Big Lesson Relatively Cheaply

Although the casualties are the largest loss of South African soldiers’ lives since the border war, the military will emerge from this learning several major lessons without having to pay for it en masse. Yes, the casualties are tragic, but the reality that sending lightly-armed and poorly-supported troops into volatile countries with zero heavy weapons or support has become obvious without the loss of hundreds of troops. In war lessons are generally learned at the expense of lost lives, but in the CAR the loss was comparatively minor.

What is crucial now is for the SANDF to take a long hard look at its deployments and make an honest assessment of the equipment and support needed. Up until now the SANDF’s operations abroad have gone smoothly, with only minor skirmishes or ambushes – in the case of the late 2012 UNAMID firefight – to concern commanders. This was a false sense of security. What happened in the CAR can happen in Sudan, and it has happened elsehwere in the DRC, both places where we have troops on deployment, and of a lesser quality than our paratroopers and Special Forces. All these deployments see our troops armed with their personal weapons, light mortars, thin-skinned vehicles or at best an armoured Casspir, and with zero additional support. This is a recipe for future disaster, and it materialised in the CAR as a nightmare. Yes, our soldiers fought well, but they should never have been placed in that situation in the first place.

Yes, our soldiers fought well, but they should never have been placed in that situation in the first place.

The reality is that the SANDF has been stripped to the bone in budgetary terms. With year on year spending set to around 1.2% of GDP, the SANDF has virtually no money to send the support our soldiers need on deployment. The cost of medium and strategic airlift capability, newer infantry combat vehicles, sending artillery on deployment, and better logistics vehicles is high, but it unfortunately necessary if the South African wishes to continue demanding these manner of deployments. Current budget levels are set according to a 15 year old Defence Review document which explicitly states the expectation that South Africa would not send its soldiers abroad. That document has been replaced with a 2012 version, which has its entire justifications of a two division military, well-armed and equipped to handle deployments abroad in whatever capacity requires. The only problem? It assumed that the budget would be increased to match it (anywhere from 1.5-2% of GDP), based on promises from the ex-Minister of Defence Lindiwe Sisulu. This has not happened, and our soldiers must pay for the government’s thriftiness in blood.

The lack of heavy weapons support for our soldiers in the CAR is criminally short-sighted. A single Rooivalk attack helicopter, for example, would have had a dramatic difference in the battle. Its ability to not only identify rebel movements from the air and provide surveillance, but to fire directly on strongpoints of enemy forces with high calibre precision weapons would have resulted in many more lives saved. The SANDF has such a Rooivalk Squadron, tucked safely away within its borders. The cost of sending them to the CAR would be large, but it would also quite literally have made the difference between life and death for some of our soldiers fighting on the ground.

Assuming a large rebel force, hardened from years of fighting in the CAR, Sudan and Chad, would not sweep right past checkpoint PK12 is either criminally-stupid or reflective of the hubris we had cultivated from years of low-casualty deployments abroad. Regardless, the SANDF is being tasked with performing serious military operations abroad but has not been issued the correct funding for it.

A common criticism of large defence spending is the question of “who are we defending against?”. The CAR, DRC and Sudan are ongoing reminders that our responsibilities as African peacemakers do not stop at our borders. Regardless of the motive for deployment, our soldiers ought to have all the required equipment and tools at their disposal. Without it we are going to continue to experience incidents like last Saturday’s battle.

South Africa Needs a Foreign Policy Yesterday

Monday morning’s television  started with our department of international relations and co-operation’s minister prattling on about the importance of BRICs partnerships and economic togetherness in order to strengthen some manner of vague and idiotic economic principle which no member state really respects anyway. What she should have been doing was explaining to South African viewers just why on earth we don’t have a codified, legislated foreign policy. The lack of a clear foreign policy means that deployments such as the CAR could either be justified under its banner, or criticised heavily because it contradicts it. Instead we are faced with a haphazard scatter-gun approach of invoking our national interest when convenient, and simply ignoring it when it’s not.

The CAR would not be a foreign policy priority for South Africa if we had anything resembling a default stance from a developing state of our country’s stature. The inability to articulate what our goals are for Africa as a whole means that deploying troops to far-flung central African countries to be shot at by rebels is never going to be resisted wholeheartedly. That we have nothing like a foreign policy is ridiculous in of itself, but that its absence results in the deployment of our soldiers on ill-conceived missions abroad borders on the criminal.