It is also motivated by the confident speech, at the swearing-in ceremony at the Moi International Sports Complex, Kasarani; which clarified the need for continued strengthening of East African bonds in the pursuit of “ultimate” integration. While the concept of ‘ultimate integration’ will require illumination, as the administration soldiers on, the President was unambiguous about how the Kenyan state understands: the global context; legitimate international mechanisms; and its role in the community of nations.

In this respect ideological contours of a Kenyan external relations construct have emerged and they seek the: prominence of nationalism within a Pan-African agenda; stimulation of the existing regional integration process; opportunities of an Afro-optimistic continent that is abundant with wealth, human and natural resources; value of multilateralism; and inclusiveness in the spirit and practice of global governance institutions.

Yet this must be viewed within the context that the country is an attractive ‘frontier’ market, a gateway to the region; a hub for trade and a centre for finance.  The country is keen on peaceful co-existence with its neighbours in order to ensure its economic prosperity. The focus of external relations is not only concerned with the survival of the incumbent administration but also a greater attention to trade and investment issues. However, despite the fact that economic and commercial diplomacy is the first pillar of Kenyan foreign policy, there is no distinct conceptualization in policy and practice that separates one from the other as defined by Raymond Saner and Lichia Yiu.

In their definition, economic diplomacy is concerned with economic policy issues at international levels and institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). It involves the monitoring and reporting of economic policies in foreign countries in order to give the home government advice on how to best influence them. It employs economic resources, either as rewards or sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy objective. This is sometimes called “economic statecraft”.

On the other hand, commercial diplomacy is the support of home country’s business and finance sectors in their pursuit of economic success and the country’s general objective for national development. It includes the promotion of inward and outward investment as well as trade. Important aspects of a commercial diplomats’ work is the supplying of information about export and investment opportunities and organising and helping to act as hosts to trade missions from home. In some cases, commercial diplomats could also promote economic ties through advising and support of both domestic and foreign companies for investment decisions.

Currently, economic diplomacy is conducted as a form of reactive pragmatism through sound economic policy, actors, activities and instruments. Therefore, the development of a concise economic and commercial diplomatic framework should be prioritized within the existing foreign policy architecture. This will require inclusivity of multiple participants and an understanding of the post-modern international environment that is characterised by fragmented relationships and socio-economic intricacies, which demand a sharper definition of Kenya’s trade interactions.

This will also require a constant monitoring of the global financial situation in order to maintain the country’s economic resilience. This can best be done through interdisciplinary engagement on sound policies and practices especially with regards to information sharing.  It will also require creative imagination on the integration path in order to achieve definitive regional unity as expressed by the desire for an “ultimate” formula.

Why would Kenya require special rapportuers in foreign policy? The presidency will need confidential and credible briefings on crucial matters that may improve the quality of decisions made. These special representatives will also instigate genuine domestic debate on foreign policy issues. This should focus on economic and commercial diplomacy within foreign policy structures. Lastly, the direct representation of the Executive by such entities will engage in continued reassurance of domestic constituencies and international partners in the face of: the effects of endemic corruption; potential political shocks with the implementation of devolution; and the progression of the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases at The Hague.

In terms of expertise a special understanding of this key foreign policy pillar will be important. Two key issues need to be at the centre of foreign policy interactions. The first is the improvement of stakeholder inclusion in policy and practise. This will involve their involvement in the development of trade negotiations as a strategy to contribute to the growth of the economy in diplomatic participation. This will also include improving the awareness of private sector organizations on the country’s rights, obligations and the mechanisms of different international agreements of which Kenya is a signatory. Such inclusivity in international trade processes should include non-governmental entities such as agricultural producers, professional organizations, private sector organizations, farmers and trade unions.

The second issue is the coordination between an Executive High Commissioner for Economic and Commercial Diplomacy-my pie in the sky proposal on the title of this foreign policy advisor a.k.a. special rapportuer- with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to ensure effective management of foreign policy. This will involve embracing basic tenets of: setting foreign policy targets; consulting various constituencies; exploring the boundaries of difficult issues within the context of overall state objectives; researching agendas of negotiating parties; and identifying future world economic scenarios to assess their effects on the Kenyan economy.

The MFA will provide guidance on the roles, initiatives and diplomatic conduct of special rapportuers under the Executive Office in the negotiations that will advance state interests. This will require proper management of diplomatic service and foreign policy. Where, the former is the appropriate allocation of resources necessary for the efficient implementation of external relations policy; while the latter is the efficient implementation of a strategy that facilitates these interactions.

Astute coordination of consultation and negotiation with different interested parties, such as, elected representatives; related ministries; academia; non-governmental organization (NGOs), media and the general public are needed to ensure an espousal of interdependence and interdisciplinary approaches by personnel. Staff knowledge should go beyond international economics, development and world events on a variety of issues so as to inform inward investment through growth oriented external relations.

The establishment of their mandate should be done through constructing special procedures and mechanisms in collaboration with the MFA so as to grant them specific authorization to investigate and report to the appointing authority. This mandate should include the examination, monitoring, advising and public reporting of issues of economic and commercial diplomacy. The conduct of this mandate should allow for exceptional procedures that: respond to individual complaints, conduct studies, provide advice on technical levels of cooperation and engaging in general promotional activities.

The structure of such an advisory office, that is a special representative of the president, could have ten Executive Commissioners. Six of them will have a sectored focus on Vision 2030 flagship projects that are currently being undertaken in tourism; agriculture; manufacturing; wholesale and retail trade; business process outsourcing; and financial services as key sectors in Kenya’s performance. Of the remaining four, three will have country specific focus at regional, continental and international levels. They will therefore coordinate actions with their ministerial counterparts. The last will serve as an administrative secretary who will be the Chief Operating Officer of this advisory staff with financial, strategic planning, and internal audit officers.

The MFA should be involved in developing procedures and practices that prevent policy, legislative and administrative conflicts on: remuneration; personnel and logistical support mechanisms; role description and application. With regards to role description the appointed rapportuers should be restricted to fact finding missions; assessing and verifying complaints. In terms of the relevance of function the terms of reference should determine the duration of service based on whether these rapportuers focus is sectored or country specific. It should also harmonise the mandate of these individuals to be closely aligned with Vision 2030.

Once completed, the quiz will show your results and a rating, along with correct and incorrect answers.

It’s a fortnight on, and the story of South African soldiers’ deaths in the CAR has begun to wane. But in between the asinine posts about when to invade African countries and the multiple-exclamation-marked and Tennyson-quoting hysterics of the DA’s shadow minister of defence and military veterans, South African media coverage in the last two weeks has frequently chosen to opt for screaming ‘rout’, and reinforcing existing Zuma-implicating conspiracy thinking over sticking to the actual facts of the case and looking beyond ANC politics for the broader questions that the CAR imbroglio raises.

Journalist were quick to frame the deaths of the thirteen South African troops as a fiasco, and take the Defence minister’s phrase “protecting South African assets” from her cack-handed encounter with the press as meaning “our army is protecting some sort of corrupt dealing”. Which provided a quick and cathartic fillip to the ongoing national epic of the ANC as an increasingly corrupt, bloody and inept organisation. Both views of what happened in Bangui are wholly incorrect, as it turns out after a modicum of digging, but frustrated readers like to have simple views confirmed, and without a lawsuit to compel it, the media aren’t partial to apologising or clarifying. The wheel of scandal can just turn over next week and replace this story with whatever contemptible crime some or other public official is up to.

The problem of course, is that you end up turning something like what happened in the CAR into some kind of news piñata, from which the lessons we learn are simple, cathartic, and misdirected. Which is not to say that there are not serious questions that the whole shenanigans should leave us with. It’s just to point out that they aren’t questions of being angry that ‘we got massacred’, or that ‘Zuma and cronies are using the army abroad to guard their mines’, as Bantu Holomisa clearly lept to conjecturing. The latter case being unusually direct, since it’s bad aspersion-casting etiquette to point specifically to something like mineral rights, because people can then investigate and tell you that there don’t appear to be any obvious conflicts of principle. It’s far more elegant to simply put the minister’s ‘South African assets’ remark in scare quotes and let cynical readers image Aurora in the CAR.

But now we have an account of what happened in Bangui that is as complete as anything we are ever likely to see. It makes for gripping reading and assuming that it is true (for lack of any reason not to), thirteen dead troops is frankly miraculous given how the battle unfolded. If there was a massacre, then it was of the Seleka forces.

We also have explanations of why were were in the CAR which appear to be legally sound, if not politically or strategically the smartest possible decisions in hindsight. We know what the operations Morero and Vimbisela were about, and we also have some idea of the reasoning that led to the deployment of special forces and paratroopers with no air or decent armour support. And we’re as sure as we can be that none of this had anything to do with protecting any corrupt investments short of Bozize himself. Who, in any event, would seem preferable to a violent, looting militia running the country.

And so the conspiracy theories of the early days, so hastily implied on the basis of no actual evidence, should be considered settled barring any major revelations. But the fuller account of the battle and the decisions that lead to it raise very real questions. Ones that require that serious attention be given to how the government makes its strategic military commitments, its utter disdain for its citizens’ right to know, and that the president and his defence minister appear to have absolutely no appreciation of the limits of the forces they are so enthusiastically committing to the continent’s fractious areas.

What exactly is our overall rationale for deploying where we do?

Our last completed defence review, fourteen years ago, decided that the SANDF didn’t have a role in peacekeeping on the continent. Which meant that we built a different kind of SANDF more suited to policing our seas than airlifting troops or – god forbid – heavy weapons or a helicopter to other parts of the continent.

Our leaders have clearly decided that there is more of a role for South Africa in African peacekeeping. And while there are good arguments for becoming more active in security issues – contrary to the facile ‘all guns are bad and we should all just negotiate’ blogs that occasionally opine on African peacekeeping – this new direction raises questions that have not even begun to be properly reasoned out. Setting up well-equipped missions of any decent length is an expensive national exercise, not to mention a literal case of possibly sending South African citizens to die. It needs to be clearer why we get involved in some conflicts and not others. Why we decide to support the CAR and not invest more in South Sudan or the DRC. “Because Bozize asked” is not a smart enough reason for ending up between his palace and a Chadian- and Sudanese-backed rebel army.

If we are going to intelligently use the resources of the SANDF as a force for good on the continent, then there needs to be much, much more clarity on why, how and where we deploy. Which requires a government that has actually considered working out the answers to those questions and journalists who are capable of asking “how does CAR fit into our overall Africa strategy”, or “Why are we deployed in the places we are?” rather than stopping at “why were in CAR last week”.

What happened in Bangui has created a broader public awareness that our armed forces seem to be in a number of places that even the above-average South African reader had no idea we were in. We are in South Sudan, we are going to the DRC, and we may, for a time, have been in Libya when it was falling apart. It’s inexcusable that we are stretching this far without a real foreign policy, and that our citizenry has so little awareness.

Which brings us to the next question.

Why is it so hard to cover our troops?

Right after the battle in Bangui became known, enough journalists emailed the SANDF requesting embeds to have utterly broken their airlift capacity. All, as far as I am aware, were stonewalled. Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula and President Zuma have made plain that they are irritated by the country questioning their decisions, and given a choice would prefer that you shut up and let the state do what is in its opinion best. Which is, incidentally, much like the attitude of the state when it once sent soldiers into Angola, or money and materiel for RENAMO’s decades-long wrecking of Mozambique.

Not allowing the details of our troops’ reasons for being where they are, the battles they fight and the reality of war is an excellent recipe for letting ill-reviewed and irresponsible decisions flourish. Just as the government needs a coherent strategy for the deployment of its troops, the families of those soldiers and the citizens in whose interests they are deployed need to know enough to hold their leaders to account. It’s not enough to effectively be told ‘trust me, I’m in charge’ when it comes to killing people in foreign lands. The minister and the president would do well to exchange their arrogance for an honest and shared discussion of the military work we do.

Embeds would be a start. It would be nice to hear the voices of our troops in the field, and understand what it means to serve in places like the DRC. With varying degrees of freedom, other militaries have managed to accommodate this. Ours fails abjectly. But even if having a journalist or two hanging along remains for the time being beyond feverish imaginings of the SANDF, being able to coherently collect the facts of the case and convey them in an open and transparent fashion is surely not beyond the capacity of our military and public officials? Between the arrogance of the Defence Minister and the affable-but-vague responses of defence chief Gen. Solly Shoke, it should not be this difficult to get direct answers to simple questions about where we were deployed, whether support was available, or why our troops are exposed to particular risks.

Our leaders must recognise the limits of SA military capacity

The 1998 defense review created an SANDF geared for no foreign deployments. We are now involved in at least three. From the most complete account of the events leading up to the battle of Bangui, SANDF chiefs made plain that the defence force was not equipped to carry out the mission asked of them without significant risk. We had to charter the planes to carry our light armour to Bangui because we have none that are suitable. We have no plane capable of carrying a Rooivalk short of dismantling it first, and we cannot fly our Grippens that far north without having to stop at the DRC equivalent of a petrol station along the way.

Despite these concerns being made clear to government, the army was told to deploy anyway. And so did the best they did with what they had. Sending elite troops, for example, rather than regular infantry. Those troops performed incredibly well, from what we know about the battle, but they shouldn’t have had to. We should have either been in Bangui with overwhelming force, or not there at all. Fighting a war should never be a case of ‘making do’, giving the proverbial tyres a kick, and hoping everyone doesn’t die.

If we are going to involve ourselves more in Africa’s security, then we need to fund and equip any army that can help protect lives in the continent’s most dangerous places without needlessly risking their own. Our government knew we were under-equipped, but chose to force the deployment. Sustained and intelligent questioning, based on meaningful access to information about our capabilities and intentions is the only way to ensure that the pressure exists to make the SANDF better able to manage the risks of deployment.

The tragedy is not that thirteen servicemen died in the CAR, it’s that they shouldn’t have had to. That our government appears to see the army as an over-extendable, ad hoc policy tool, the lives of its soldiers as an abstract cost, and the citizens of the country as a nagging pest.

These, rather than facile hyperbole and insinuations of corruption, are the hard challenges.

 Image by Barbourians

-Albert Einstein

A curious element of mature democracies is how political parties or movements deal with electoral loss. It cannot be ignored that many of those who voted for Raila Odinga are not particularly elated by the judgement of the Supreme Court. Yet the outcome has brought closure to the 2013 election contest that was mainly between the winning Jubilee Coalition that is led by Uhuru Kenyatta; and the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) that was led by Odinga.

The shock of the outcome has sent CORD supporters wallowing in sorrow. Some seem to have assigned the court ruling pseudo biblical comparisons to the release of Barabbas. Nevertheless, in this darkest of night those who stand for democracy must find a way to see the brightest of day.  It is not time to begrudge the Chief Justice and his team as amicus impunitatem. This is too harsh even for a court of public opinion. A detailed judgement will be released and the conclusions that will be drawn from it can then serve as lessons for the ages.

For most CORD supporters, the feeling of affront is buried deep within their inherent idealism. This optimism is grounded in the reform movement in Kenyan history that promises inclusivity in all spheres of life within the polity. However, the raw emotion of betrayal that is being exhibited in the continuing callous chatter of social media and the whispered conversations among different core elements of CORD support should lead to a place of self reflection. Thus the question on whether there is a steadfast commitment to ‘Orange’ politics?

Orange politics is the political belief in constitutional democratic processes that sprouted from the legacy of the 2005 referendum and whose genesis can be traced to the reform struggles of Kenya’s history. The symbol of an orange was assigned to those who were against the proposed ‘Waki’ draft. While the issues of debate were in regards executive powers, land reforms and religious courts most Kenyans took the referendum as an opportunity to show approval or disapproval of the Kibaki administration. This was the fissure that drove the country to the near abysmal situation of 2007/8.

A post-chaos coalition government and a subsequent referendum led to the fulfilment of a new constitution that curtailed excessive executive powers; established devolved government; enhanced freedoms; and instituted rights. This mainly came about as a result of, among other factors, the agenda of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party which is the core manifestation of Orange politics.

Initially championed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the resulting formation of ODM became the centrepiece of Orange political activity under the guidance of Odinga. Subsequent fallout led to the formation of the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K)-later the Wiper Democratic Movement (WDM) under the leadership of Kalonzo Musyoka; The National Alliance (TNA) led by Uhuru Kenyatta; and United Republican Party (URP) by William Ruto. Messrs Kenyatta and Rutto are now set to be president and deputy president respectively under the Jubilee coalition after a court ruling buy the Supreme Court legitimized their win which was challenged by Odinga.

This occurrence can be premised to have taken place within a context of –to use a classical description-an emergent ideological posturing. In this environment continuing realignments came about with new political questions, parties and agendas at a state, regional and international level. Ideologically, two major alignments stand out. First is a nationalist bloc that has historically espoused the centralization of power in policy, law and administration of governance.

This bloc is primarily concerned with unifying the country for its aims and it can be described as conservative considering its independence legacy that runs through the narrative of Harambee and Nyayo. Second is the democratic bloc that has advocated the decentralization of state control. This communion seeks inclusivity in the affairs of the Kenyan commonwealth and can be described as reformist considering its legacy of struggle through advocating for constitutionalism as captured in the legacy of the repeal of Section 2A, the Inter-Parties parliamentary Group (IPPG) agreement, and two constitutional referendums.

Also, within this context there exist centrist blocs and fringe movements. The first centrist element can be termed as a pragmatic syndicate that is primarily concerned with the stability of the country. A salient bureaucratic offshoot of nationalism this pragmatism comes from the legacy of Sessional Paper Number 10 of 1963 on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. This manifested under the candidature of Musalia Mudavadi through his United Democratic Forum (UDF).The second centrist element –which is also an offshoot of nationalism-can be described as a republican constituency that is ‘of the law, by the law and for the law’. This hereby meaning its aim and purpose is the defence of due process in governance principally by legal and administrative means. This facet was represented by the candidature of Martha Karua through the National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya (NARC-K), and Peter Kenneth’s Kenya National Congress (KNC).

Lastly are the fringe movements. These are peripheral entities from the centre of political contestation. Small political parties-whose champion became Mohammed Abduba Dida with his Alliance for Real Change (ARC); civil society; the private sector; and media fit in this classification. Their participation in the affairs of the commonwealth is subject to their interests and favourability of alignments.

So did Orange politics falter and become a political instrument to settle tribal scores as captured by the vitriol of the resulting lamentations? This reflective question on the general public’s commitment to Orange politics should examine the loss in a way that compels the denunciation that tribal mobilization was the winning formula on this election. If CORD supporters are to accept this as a credible proposition then nothing stops them from using such political methods in future contests. This would be a strategy contrary to its current position and its overall idealistic premise. The alluring simplicity of the argument on ‘tyrannical’ numbers could easily blind CORD constituents from acknowledging inherent faults in their campaign.

First is the dependence on what James Verini has termed in Foreign Policy as ‘the force of international condemnation’ over ‘national conscience’. The understanding of the International Criminal Court (ICC) case as an external relations construct rather a local issue did not recognize the national guilt of Kenyans who understood that in all this, they may have partly contributed in one form or the other to the mess that was the post-election violence. Secondly, the campaign was not audacious enough in its discipline of organization and in the ideals that it stood for. The land question, a subject that CORD put on the table, exposed a level of insincerity in their campaign. Considering the timing, this mixed public perceptions on the matter especially in light of how sensitive the subject is in the country.

Further contemplation forces an examination of other aspects.  In this category, the first concerns the electoral debate. Did the discussion on sanctions amount to fear mongering? Why didn’t it appeal to the considerations of the masses? Can it be said, that, this was a complex middle class discussion that required a level of simplicity to appeal more to the lower class. In response to the campaign charges laid at their feet, the Jubilee coalition defiantly crafted credible responses in tandem with the national psyche-know referred to as ‘moving on’ politics- granting them various degrees of legitimacy.

The second is the diminishing identity of reform. What is the difference between the reformist and the conservative in terms of development ideals, process of policy making, manner of decision making; levels of implementation; and degree of actualization, now that this collective has had a reasonable taste of power since 2002. Why didn’t this come out clearly during the campaign? The contrast of any existing styles should have been stark enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the electorate on why CORD deserved a landslide victory.

Mutuma Mathiu captures it best; the “Left has learnt all the bad manners of the old establishment”. The imagery associated with the CORD candidature shows that there is an exceeding compromise on issues which is to its own detriment; or the left is inherently compromised and has no authority on issues concerning the state; international political economy and freedom-with all its associated liberties.

Nevertheless, to claim that the left has lost the logic for its existence is to conformism at the altar of nationalist triumphalism. Leftist politics, if contextualised in the Kenyan space to mean the democracy of reformist credentials is necessary now more than ever. The questions of future leadership; the integrity of institutions; the implementation of devolution and reform of the electoral system are still begging answers. It would therefore be irresponsible for the CORD axis to tuck its tail and not contribute any solutions to them.

The leadership question demands a move from personalities to institutions. Transparent, democratic processes are necessary. The ‘spoils’ system of awarding positions must give way to a merit system that puts a premium on ability rather than on patronage an or sycophancy. This should target a cleaner nomination exercise come the next election cycle. The purity of devolution must be defended. Here the constitution’s spirit reigns supreme due to the bipartisan need to deliver on campaign promises, service delivery, and development goals for the actualization of human rights as guaranteed in the constitution.

Lastly, there has to be an engagement on reforming the electoral system. The hype by the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) on effectiveness did nothing to tackle the sheer magnitude of its systemic complexity. This certainly requires an overhaul that makes its conduct more transparent and credible. There may also be a need for a staggered arrangement to prevent the lumping of issues and constituencies that blur executive issues at the centre from those of the county.

Of course this has to be done in the face of challenges which will mainly revolve around the management of the coalition so that it presents a credible opposition in parliament. A major issue to guard against is the fragmentation to oblivion of the coalition and individual parties within it so as not to follow the example as exemplified by the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), and KANU.

The focus must squarely intend to implement the constitution while actualizing prosperity. This means that this so called left should not aim to stifle any progress achieved by the incoming administration but ensure their achievements do not infringe upon the rights of Kenyans in the pursuit of growth. This will allow for consolidation of strongholds and providing an opportunity to seek support in new areas based on the track records of CORD county governments.

Therefore, keeping support and winning followers will require rejuvenation in terms of the provision of new leadership to capture elective posts, constructive messaging, and visionary ideas. Orange politics must peacefully re-engineer the debate on how best to confront the past within the context of pursuing prosperity and the national psyche. For as Mr. Abduba Dida ably put it in the course of the presidential debates “How will Kenya find harmony if some feet are still stepping on the peoples toes?”

Image by Radio Nederland Wereldomroep

Our Soldiers Fought Well

There has been a long-running misconception that our soldiers cannot fight. That they’re all HIV positive layabouts incapable of doing any actual soldiering. Naturally this might be true for certain portions of the military, as it would be for virtually any defence force around the world, but Saturday’s firefight proved, above everything else, that our soldiers are not only capable of defending themselves, they are able to fight back with a tempo that rivals most international forces of the same calibre. 200 paratroopers and Special Forces troops faced off against 3000 rebels advancing, according to the Chief of the SANDF, General Shoke, on a 1km wide front is no laughing matter. That our soldiers were able to hold their ground against a numerically-superior force armed with large-calibre machine guns, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and all other manner of weapons, is an impressive feat. That we were able to inflict an estimated 500 casualties on the enemy is an excellent outcome. The loss of 13 SANDF servicemen is tragic, but those lives were not given easily.

No matter what criticism is leveled at higher command, the South African Government, the media, or any other outlet, the South Africans fighting for their lives this past weekend fought bravely and fought well, and that should put to rest any questions on the ability of our elite soldiers. Allegations and rumours of a hurried and panicked retreat in the face of the rebels is by all official and credible accounts false. Our soldiers did not cut and run when the bullets started to fly, but rather held their ground, returned fire, coordinated mortar strikes (according to the CSANDF), organised their lines, and ultimately fought like one would expect a well-trained and disciplined force to act. Amidst the cloud of allegations leveled at the state, that our soldiers fought well must remain a paramount fact above all else.

The Military Learned A Big Lesson Relatively Cheaply

Although the casualties are the largest loss of South African soldiers’ lives since the border war, the military will emerge from this learning several major lessons without having to pay for it en masse. Yes, the casualties are tragic, but the reality that sending lightly-armed and poorly-supported troops into volatile countries with zero heavy weapons or support has become obvious without the loss of hundreds of troops. In war lessons are generally learned at the expense of lost lives, but in the CAR the loss was comparatively minor.

What is crucial now is for the SANDF to take a long hard look at its deployments and make an honest assessment of the equipment and support needed. Up until now the SANDF’s operations abroad have gone smoothly, with only minor skirmishes or ambushes – in the case of the late 2012 UNAMID firefight – to concern commanders. This was a false sense of security. What happened in the CAR can happen in Sudan, and it has happened elsehwere in the DRC, both places where we have troops on deployment, and of a lesser quality than our paratroopers and Special Forces. All these deployments see our troops armed with their personal weapons, light mortars, thin-skinned vehicles or at best an armoured Casspir, and with zero additional support. This is a recipe for future disaster, and it materialised in the CAR as a nightmare. Yes, our soldiers fought well, but they should never have been placed in that situation in the first place.

The reality is that the SANDF has been stripped to the bone in budgetary terms. With year on year spending set to around 1.2% of GDP, the SANDF has virtually no money to send the support our soldiers need on deployment. The cost of medium and strategic airlift capability, newer infantry combat vehicles, sending artillery on deployment, and better logistics vehicles is high, but it unfortunately necessary if the South African wishes to continue demanding these manner of deployments. Current budget levels are set according to a 15 year old Defence Review document which explicitly states the expectation that South Africa would not send its soldiers abroad. That document has been replaced with a 2012 version, which has its entire justifications of a two division military, well-armed and equipped to handle deployments abroad in whatever capacity requires. The only problem? It assumed that the budget would be increased to match it (anywhere from 1.5-2% of GDP), based on promises from the ex-Minister of Defence Lindiwe Sisulu. This has not happened, and our soldiers must pay for the government’s thriftiness in blood.

The lack of heavy weapons support for our soldiers in the CAR is criminally short-sighted. A single Rooivalk attack helicopter, for example, would have had a dramatic difference in the battle. Its ability to not only identify rebel movements from the air and provide surveillance, but to fire directly on strongpoints of enemy forces with high calibre precision weapons would have resulted in many more lives saved. The SANDF has such a Rooivalk Squadron, tucked safely away within its borders. The cost of sending them to the CAR would be large, but it would also quite literally have made the difference between life and death for some of our soldiers fighting on the ground.

Assuming a large rebel force, hardened from years of fighting in the CAR, Sudan and Chad, would not sweep right past checkpoint PK12 is either criminally-stupid or reflective of the hubris we had cultivated from years of low-casualty deployments abroad. Regardless, the SANDF is being tasked with performing serious military operations abroad but has not been issued the correct funding for it.

A common criticism of large defence spending is the question of “who are we defending against?”. The CAR, DRC and Sudan are ongoing reminders that our responsibilities as African peacemakers do not stop at our borders. Regardless of the motive for deployment, our soldiers ought to have all the required equipment and tools at their disposal. Without it we are going to continue to experience incidents like last Saturday’s battle.

South Africa Needs a Foreign Policy Yesterday

Monday morning’s television  started with our department of international relations and co-operation’s minister prattling on about the importance of BRICs partnerships and economic togetherness in order to strengthen some manner of vague and idiotic economic principle which no member state really respects anyway. What she should have been doing was explaining to South African viewers just why on earth we don’t have a codified, legislated foreign policy. The lack of a clear foreign policy means that deployments such as the CAR could either be justified under its banner, or criticised heavily because it contradicts it. Instead we are faced with a haphazard scatter-gun approach of invoking our national interest when convenient, and simply ignoring it when it’s not.

The CAR would not be a foreign policy priority for South Africa if we had anything resembling a default stance from a developing state of our country’s stature. The inability to articulate what our goals are for Africa as a whole means that deploying troops to far-flung central African countries to be shot at by rebels is never going to be resisted wholeheartedly. That we have nothing like a foreign policy is ridiculous in of itself, but that its absence results in the deployment of our soldiers on ill-conceived missions abroad borders on the criminal.

New legislation facilitating this process at various stages: some having been passed into law; some awaiting publication after being approved by Cabinet; some currently under review as stake holder consultations are being conducted; and others being put on hold. Their purpose is to establish a democratic, institutional command structure for the country’s security apparatus. In this sense state security is perceived through the logic of the defense and policing of the republic. State security being the maintenance of a country’s survival through the projection of economic, diplomatic political power, whereas state policing is the enforcement of the rule of law, the protection of property and the limiting of civil disorder.

In giving effect to the constitution; legislation on the former, has granted functions to appointed organs while setting up roles for proposed participants. Meanwhile, in facilitating the latter; legislation has provided for additional functions and powers in law enforcement by setting new standards in the qualification for appointments and in allowing civilian oversight over procedures by establishing an independent authority.

However, both have drawn considerable opposition. In the case of state security, resistance is primarily due to the exceptional nature of provisions that exclude elected officials from security planning and management at lower levels and allow infringements on privacy. This has raised fears of arbitrary and unlicensed acts of force and pervasive acts of cruelty or torture by the security apparatus in any regime. This is particularly due to a lack of procedure in the drafting of the laws, which may perpetuate impunity through the rejection of meaningful, open public scrutiny and deliberation of its operations or institutions. Debates on state policing have largely been a clash of institutional vs principled perspectives; with the establishment arguing for the integrity of security operations and structure, while extended entities are demanding a shift in the policing regime that is more responsive to public expectations.

The scrutiny of security should not fail to examine its actions, decisions, and political consequences. This should help determine levels of accountability, legitimacy and public judgment through societal mediations that address the collective and individual fears in the country. It therefore demands a combination of embracing the fears of possibilities with institutionalized positions, principled capital and public insights in the politics of security, that claims rights in the formulation of appropriately answerable decisions.

Ultimately, debate should explicitly acknowledge the local nature of threats and an end to prevalent ‘denialism’ and a shift in the country’s perceptions at all levels – from being a victim to becoming a source of insecurity. An acknowledgement of this wider context should encourage inclusiveness. The outcome and long term viability of such debate is fundamentally hinged on how these reforms should extend coordination; not only within the security services but also with other agencies and authorities. Accomplished security policy should collaborate proactively in the development and expansion of mechanisms into trustworthy security communes that will consequently shape the nature of work, the remit of oversight, as well as influencing declassification so as to explicate what should or should not be considered as activities befitting our national security.

Image from US Army Africa

Not that there would ever be a level of rape that could be considered acceptable – ours is just so fantastically brutal as to occupy an entirely different and altogether elevated strata of the savage things that we are capable of doing to one another. But this is not a polemic on how terrible rape is. Such writing makes regular appearances in our national and local media with scarcely a reaction – the media equivalent of screaming into a jet engine.

What this is, is a question of why years and years of detailed reporting of the rape of women, men, children and the elderly in South Africa fails over and over again to provoke any kind of real and sustained outrage.  Why, as a nation, are we so utterly impotent in the face of such an epidemic of violence?

Like any complicated question, there are dozens, probably hundreds of threads that heavily influence the way we do or don’t respond to particular issues as a nation. Patriarchy is most definitely one. We consistently undervalue and oppress women. So too is the ongoing dehumanisation of each other that was one of the lasting gifts of apartheid. We find it so hard to empathise, because we have grown up in the shell of a society specifically engineered not to. Reclusive, elite fortresses like Dainfern, the prevalence of township tourism and infantile op-eds explaining blacks to whites and whites to blacks only make the point more sharply.

These problems are crippling. But not the one that I’m most keen to discuss here. For lack of space, more than lack of interest, because I am fairly sure whole books could be – and probably have been – written on patriarchy and broken humanity in South Africa. In the latter case, Wretched of the Earth still reads uncomfortably like a description of the last few decades in the country.

To these defects in our ability to actively care or feel outrage, we should perhaps also add our large-scale unfamiliarity with what it means to be a citizen. I am starting to suspect that the reason South Africans fail to stop rape, fail to stop violent crime, fail to stop corruption, and fail to end gross equality is because we fail, overall, as citizens.

We have never really known what it means to hold power to account. We have never really been properly comfortable with the idea of action in the service of principles. And given our history, it’s hardly surprising.

The end of apartheid pretty much saw the collapse of civil society in South Africa. Groups that had long campaigned for dignity, freedom and human rights for all more or less declared the battle won, and fell silent in the post-1994 euphoria. Others, whose funds came from abroad, saw their work shrink as donors redirected funding to other resistances of other injustice elsewhere in the world.

And who was there to resist in any event? The government then was full of an ANC that radiated hope in a more just and equal future. It was all Mandela, rugby jerseys and learning a new national anthem. The cancerous tick of an ANC that infects South Africa today hadn’t happened yet, and (on paper, at least) we had designed space for ensuring that rights like dignity would be meaningfully pursued by the government, our courts, and the constellations of oversight bodies that were established around them.

The idea of an open, democratic civil society from which outrage and political action could emerge – nonexistent under apartheid – seemed bizarre in the post-’94 euphoria. Who would be resisted when the evil had been overthrown and only a government of heroes remained?

We would discover later – after the arms deal, Tony Yengeni, travelgate, and the moral descent that the Zuma administration has come to represent – that there was in fact much that a politically engaged civil society should have been doing. But it’s a lesson that’s only now being learned.

Even before 1994 (notable exceptions aside) South Africans didn’t generally see themselves as political agents under apartheid either. In the main, a generation or more simply existed, complicitly, with whatever the politics were of the day. Unless it affected you directly, no questions were openly asked, no stand was taken. A kind of ‘politics only when it affects me’ kind of outlook that happened to suit the architects of a divided country very well.

Come universal suffrage in 1994, that consensus didn’t seem to change all that much. Those who could afford to, moved into fortified complexes or suburban spaces where they could exist without having to deal with the sharp edge of South Africa’s faultlines. It would be years before many white folks would dare to visit a township. Most haven’t yet reached the point of asking why they continue to exist.

With notable exceptions like the TAC and the R2K campaign more recently, the idea that I have a responsibility as an individual to dedicate some of my time and energy to making the country better remains an utterly foreign concept. Asinine exercises like volunteering on Mandela Day or ‘liking’ polemics on Facebook aside, it remains utterly novel for most South Africans to consider spending days or weeks of their time engaging in activism, lobbying, protest or other directly political forms of engagement.

If you are having a grumpy day, it’s easy to simply dismiss the phenomenon as laziness. South Africans just can’t be arsed to give up sport on a Sunday or a night of partying to spend that time in the active service of causes they believe in. But that’s a lazy analysis. We’ve never, as a nation, seen ourselves as citizens. It’s a foreign idea. We’ve always been a nation ruled by elites, approachable only indirectly.

Where we have political ideas, they circulate in private when they should be pursued publicly. Left as disapproving commentary online, or private frustration, when they should translate into making contact with others and finding ways to take bigger, collaborative action. Less Facebook politics and more actually entering the offices of a place like Equal Education or One in Nine and saying, “Hi. I think this shit is wrong and would like to help stop it.”.

In asking the question, “why aren’t we outraged about rape”, I suspect we need to first ask “why aren’t we outraged by anything.”

Only if we can learn that we are meant to act, and that it is reasonable, acceptable and laudable, can we be capable of doing so.

Image by Francisco Osario

Annan hinted at travel restrictions and the fact that many governments around the world will simply not deal directly with a leadership that will comprise of suspects. Of course a round of rebuttals, phrasing and campaign messaging about how Kenyans should be left to make their own choice was the expected reaction. However, my only wish is that out of this political gamesmanship an explanation on how we could survive any form of sanctions can be given.

So, what do Kenyans need to know about sanctions? Of course a simple understanding of our political economy would suffice. The four major elements of the Kenyan economy are its land, its free market orientation, its need for foreign investments and its propensity to trade. Its production is highly driven by informal labour and varied skill levels of employment; the presence of Multi National Corporations (MNCs) in the country; and access to regional markets.
The Kenyan economy is one that is highly dependent and responsive to world prices due to our production of primary products. It has a relatively vibrant manufacturing sector while it still relies on a massive agricultural base that is said to be shrinking due to growth in the service industry that has experienced an expansion in the communication and tourism sectors.

An elaborate power infrastructure is being developed; the country has a proud constellation of profitable public; and private enterprises some of which have a regional presence. The country has experienced relatively positive growth despite consistently facing social, economic or environmentally related shocks. Its working population comprises an ever growing entrepreneurial ‘merchant’ class; an expanding civil service – especially with the implementation of devolution under the constitution of Kenya 2010; and a professional class in a wide variety of fields.

All this will probably be put to test under economic or international sanctions if we choose to vote in a government that comprises Messrs Kenyatta and Ruto. Economic sanctions are obviously the lesser of the two evils as this will typically be a ban on trade that is limited to targeting certain sectors of the economy with certain exceptions that are normally within social sectors such as food and medicine. International sanctions on the other hand are intended to coerce a change in behaviour. This is the probable trajectory considering the enormity of transgression attached to crimes against humanity within the international value system. Depending on how crushing those imposing these instruments intend them to be, economic sanctions can morph into international sanctions.

So how would Kenya operate under such conditions? The obvious answer on every pundit’s lips seems to be the country’s ‘Look East’ policy that has been prompted by the current administration. Would this keep the country afloat? A perusal of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics’ Economic Survey 2012 shows that in theory this strategy would suffice considering the concentration of trade activities within the continent. If the country was to maintain or improve its exports to Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle and the Far East, the country would shrink the Balance of Trade by almost US$ 3 Billion.

However, going by the norm in international relations especially with regards to alliance building in support of sanctions, this could be a whole different matter. If one was to loosely base this on the simple fact that President Barack Obama now has a second term in office then the influence of the United States (US) would surely test our abilities to import or export goods that are necessary within the different segments of our economy. This is definitely because of US uneasiness with Kenya having ICC suspects for its leadership.

Kenya is a net importer and therefore that means that in every sector, industry, public or private enterprise we need a foreign good or item (and in some few instances a person) for our productive endeavours. Therefore, considering that by a rough calculation of quick conversion, the Kenyan state would automatically lose US$ 3.6 Billion in imports, US$ 1.8 Billion in exports, the citizens of this country should definitely have some food for thought. Also, the fact that while this is happening the country will have to preserve traditional markets while negotiating for markets in the Middle and Far East in contestation with countries of far greater influence than itself on the world stage would be a stretch for the Republic.

Speculatively, under an Obama administration a Kenyan government experiencing sanctions in the form of what the Zimbabwean government has gone through would be suspended from any preferential trade agreement such as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and any or all economic deals signed between the two governments. Since the US and the United Kingdom are traditional allies a suspension from the Commonwealth of Nations would not be too far fetched considering the precedent that has been set down in Harare.

Targeted actions in the model of the European measures that institute travel bans and asset freezes-to as many as two hundred individuals and over forty companies; in conjunction with parallel measures as a result of a US Executive Order; and subsequent legislation similar to the US Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 would oppose any form of refinancing from international financial institutions or wave any form of debt relief pursued. Further the country’s voting rights at the international Monetary Fund would most likely be suspended.

At this point in time Kenyans obviously have no idea what form such actions would take. Thus, whether they will be targeted or broad and sweeping sanctions, the lessons from our Zimbabwean comrades are not to be ignored. Increased social tensions, conflict, unemployment, and poverty -as if we don’t have enough of that already- will be the direct effects to the mass population.

Kenya’s vulnerability to shocks whether economic or environmental will increase and the ominous hyperinflation will turn the populace into instant millionaires of no worth. Chronic shortages will not be too far behind. It therefore all well and good for the people of Kenya to decide what they want under the auspices on sovereignty; but it is also important to let them know that the peoples of other states, as represented by their governments, have a practical endorsement to determine whether our relations are of any value or importance in accordance with their norms and perspectives.

Therefore, they can choose whether they would like to associate with our country, just as much as we can choose not to associate with them notwithstanding our knowledge of the fact that all actions in any relationship have consequences. Lastly, it is worth noting how in 2012 the Kenya government retreated from its proposed dealings with the Iranian government in the attainment of oil shipments to the country. This frantic eating of humble pie took place once the country was presented with the option sanctions by its traditional friends. Thus it provides a case of how fragile our ‘Look East Policy’ and it gives a clear sense of the current administration’s position on the matter.

As a young Kenyan I will boldly shift from our tradition of addressing issues by apportioning blame and tagging different sections of society as culprits as Mutoko diligently does week after week. In my examination of our history, systems and the Constitution of Kenya 2010 it seems we have a fundamental flaw in the practise of our foundational construct – our nationalism.

Whether it was ‘Harambee’ (Coming together), ‘Nyayo’ (Footsteps) or ‘African Social Justice’, it seems our conduct of nationalism does not go beyond the cobbling of identities in one form or the other for the benefit of a few. Our democratic credentials have no value either. It seems our politics is always about ‘reforms of convenience’. Our ‘Haki Yetu’ (our rights) chants never conclusive end or translate into ‘Wajibu Wetu’ (our responsibilities) actions.

This is therefore the first reason why I am doubtful of all the said coalitions; because they promise to bring us together but they don’t definitely articulate what will happen after that. Kenyans have always come together when our needs demanded us to do so; a good example being the Kenyans for Kenyans initiative.

Nevertheless every time our unity has been cobbled together by so called nationalists it has been for naught. So unless some illumination emerges to expound what this nationalism really means in terms of economic and social cohesion, within the context of entrenching devolution, I see no need to register my biometric data.

Secondly, I guess it’s time we should stop thinking of record numbers as a basis for authenticity in every electoral political decision we will make. The frustrations of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in attaining the eighteen million target should not be cause for alarm since if one is to consider the fact that double registration and ‘ghost’ voters are expected to be curtailed then the number of the electorate is also bound to come down. Therefore, the Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) technological input is working at maximum efficiency.

Nonetheless, this election could actually reveal what are the most important stakes in our republic. Kenya has clusters of people from all cadres of society who are completely unaffected by what happens in the event of prosperity or crisis. To them life either continues to be better or worse depending on their circumstances. Yet, they are continually herded into participating in a process that makes no changes in their lives.

Thus, those who may turn out to vote will be those that actually experience the changes that arise from engaging in political processes. Their sentiments will thus be weighted on our electoral scales making them the most vested and hence the most legitimate entities to make the decisions necessary for our country. This is why the issue of voter registration should be about legitimate numbers rather than record numbers.

So it should not be a surprise that for whatever reasons the interests of many citizens, like me, are not vested enough for them to consider ourselves credible elements in pursuing the progress of the country. Allowing those who feel about strongly about their interest to do so may be more responsible as it allows a genuine contestation of vested interests at play within the polity.

My situation as with many others is one of apathy and fatigue. My lack of caring, which I beg to assume is the case with many others, is due to the complete disregard for the interests of our ‘new’ republic in relation to our constitutional text as we head towards the next elections.

While I am expected to be voter fatigued as a consequence of the requirement to vote too often, our Kenyan situation is one that is so highly charged with political gamesmanship that it reduces the political worth of the individual’s right to make choices. This then results to lower turnout as a result of our lack of interest, the resulting inconveniences’, and lack of self worth in the political process.

Kelvin Doe is just another amazing young African man beating the odds. Kelvin is a self-taught innovator from Sierra Leone, finding exciting new ways to use what little resources he has at his disposal to develop solutions to local problems. Is innovation just the new discourse of capital in the Global North? Or is it possible for Africans to participate in the innovation hype in an empowering manner? Let us know what you think.